Suril Desai
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July 30, 2024
Revolutionizing ITDR with cyber deception
In the rapidly evolving world of cybersecurity, traditional Identity Threat Detection and Response (ITDR) systems are foundational in safeguarding organizational assets. Yet, these systems frequently display critical gaps, especially when faced with sophisticated, identity-based threats and the exploitation of system vulnerabilities. These traditional systems rely heavily on signature-based detection, anomaly behavior analysis, and logs, which may not effectively distinguish between legitimate activities and sophisticated malicious tactics. As attackers continue to evolve their techniques, especially in exploiting third-party components and using stolen credentials, the limitations of traditional ITDR become apparent.
Why attacks succeed: despite the deployment of traditional monitoring approaches on Active Directory (AD) and cloud identity stores, identity-based attacks are continuing to escalate at an alarming rate.
Attackers have evolved with stealthy techniques that exploit gaps in traditional ITDR for credential misuse and privilege escalation, such as:
Cached credentials: are copies of user authentication data stored locally to speed up re-authentication processes, including passwords, session tokens, and Kerberos tickets. While they enhance system performance and user convenience, they also provide attackers with a potential goldmine. Cybercriminals leverage tools like Mimikatz, LaZagne, Seatbelt, and other credential dumping utilities to extract these credentials from various caches (like Windows Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) cache, and browser caches), enabling them to persist within networks, move laterally across systems, and escalate privileges. The subtlety of these attacks often allows them to bypass traditional security measures, which struggle to differentiate between legitimate and malicious use of these credentials.
Third-party sync agents and identity stores beyond AD: organizations are increasingly adopting a hybrid identity architecture with cloud identity providers (IdP) for identity federation. To keep AD in sync with the cloud IdP, synchronization agents are deployed. Additionally, organizations have servers such as Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) and Active Directory Certificate Services (ADCS) that have trusted access to AD. Attackers target the third-party sync agents to gain access to domain credentials, leveraging the lack of monitoring on these agents to obtain access to privileged credentials.
Stealthy attacks that evade traditional detection mechanisms: attackers have evolved, with stealthy attacks such as offline attacks, client-side attacks that evade traditional detection approaches based on monitoring AD network traffic and logs. Offline attacks such as Kerberoasting, client-side attacks such as Silver Ticket attacks are being used with increasing frequency by attackers. These attack techniques do not result in anomalous network traffic or event log traces, resulting in detection gaps through traditional ITDR approaches.
Adversary in the middle (AITM) attacks: attackers gain access to domain credentials through AITM techniques such as LLMNR poisoning and use these credentials for lateral movement. Traditional ITDR is unable to detect malicious use of the valid credentials.
Cyber deception emerges as a critical solution to these challenges. It introduces deceptive elements, such as honey accounts and honeytokens, strategically placed within the identity stores and endpoints to lure and detect attackers by triggering undeniable indicators of an incursion. This proactive defense mechanism not only enhances detection capabilities but also provides actionable intelligence, enabling more effective and rapid response. By addressing the inherent weaknesses of conventional detection methods, especially in the context of cached credentials and stealthy identity attack techniques, cyber deception creates a more resilient and adaptive security posture against the increasingly complex threat landscape.
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